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Essay
IS THIS APPROPRIATE?
THOMAS L. SHAFFERt
JULIA B. MEISTER
INTRODUCnION
The word "appropriate" is so wildly overused in American
culture that, as with other vacuous words and phrases, a person
learns to read right through it. "Appropriate" is verbal tofu. This
Essay pauses instead of reading through, particularly to notice the
instances in which "appropriate" and its negative counterpart are
used to give the appearance of a moral or legal judgment.
"Appropriate," chosen to express a legal judgment, is not only
vacuous; it is also irresponsible. It catches the legislator, judge, or
administrator in the act of passing the buck, as the President did
when he ordered the Justice Department "to take all appropriate
steps" to obtain a reversal of a decision by the D.C. Circuit re-
garding the employment of replacement workers during strikes.1
The choice of "inappropriate" to express moral judgment is
not only thoughtless; it is the attempt to have it both ways ethical-
ly, to appear to use the human capacity to separate right from
wrong, good from bad, without actually doing so. Whatever slight
moral judgment it implies rests on a cultural ethic of individual-
ism, a moral discourse for a society of autonomous agents in
which the principal or only criterion for moral action is choice:
what makes an action right or good is that the actor chooses it, as
liberated as possible from the moral influence of others. Every
person is her own tyrant. For example:
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1. Appeals Court Overturns Clinton's Order, SOUTH BEND TRMi., Feb. 3, 1996, at
A2.
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Eva-Noel Bevilacqua completed the requirements for a high-
school-equivalency diploma in Liberty, New York, in June 1995.
She was invited to graduation ceremonies, and arranged to recite a
poem, apparently of her own composition, called "Love Is a Chal-
lenge." When the time came for her poem, she took off her aca-
demic gown, under which she wore leather boots and nothing else.
No one invited her to put her robe back on or attempted to stop
her reading of the poem. Why not? When a reporter asked Barba-
ra Provenzano, who was in the audience, for her opinion, Ms.
Provenzano said, "She wanted to make a statement. I don't think
it was inappropriate."2
Ms. Provenzano did not use "appropriate" in its tradition-
al-and now antiquated-sense, to mean that recitation in the
nude during diploma ceremonies is distinctive to the poetry of Ms.
Bevilacqua.3 She used the word to express but not explain her
moral judgment. There is nothing unusual about this use of the
word in America in the 1990s. "Appropriate" and "inappropriate"
are trendy words. They have become common, various, and impre-
cise. They are used so often in the press, in discussion within the
professions, particularly in the law, and in moral discourse, that
they deserve the most disdainful of all verdicts pronounced by
wordwatchers: the words are hackneyed.
By way of introduction to a more serious discussion, consider
the headlines of newspapers and magazines. There is no more
reliable way to locate what is hackneyed in American discourse
than to compare these headlines (written by headline writers) with
the language chosen by writers for the articles themselves. The
Christian Science Monitor's headline writer for the editorial page
excelled at this sort of alteration for a while. Over a letter com-
plaining that an editorial cartoon was in poor taste, the headline
writer inserted "Appropriate Humor."4 Over an editorial approv-
ing of the exercise of executive clemency by the governors of
Virginia and Maryland, the headline writer crafted "Appropriate
Clemency. 5
2. Her Poem is Barely Acceptable, SOUTH BEND TRIB., June 23, 1995, at A2.
3. See OXFORD ENGISH DIcIONARY 587 (2d ed. 1989) (defining "appropriate" as
"[a]ssigned to a particular person; special; individual"). Coleridge spoke in this sense of
ennui, not of nudity, as "the chief and appropriate business of the poet." Id.
4. CHRISTIAN Scx. MoNrron, July 29, 1993, at 20.
5. CHRISTIAN SCa MONITOR, Feb. 28, 1991, at 20.
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In Time, William A. Henry, III, using clear words of moral
judgment, produced an exacting essay on the journalistic ethics
involved in reporting on the private lives of politicians. The job of
journalists, he wrote, is to decide where the line is between priva-
cy and the "right to know," and "then, having drawn the line,...
to avoid being pulled across it by cunning manipulators."6 He
spoke of reporters who have "gone too far," of exercising jour-
nalistic judgment "thoughtfully and ethically," of the "compromise
[of] standards," of journalists who "imperil their credibility and
integrity."7 The headline writer's contribution to that fine essay
on ethics?-"To 'Out' or Not to 'Out': The Press Wrestles With a
Thorny Issue: When is it Appropriate to Reveal the Private Lives
of Public Officials?"
'8
A newspaper headline writer drew attention to an article on
the removal of General Dimitrov's embalmed body from the pub-
lic mausoleum in Sofia with: "The Ash Heap of History: Ador-
ation Is No Longer Appropriate for a Former Communist Star."9
The headline writer at Sports Illustrated placed atop a sensitive
essay on a sensitive issue: "Indians Have Ceased to Be Appropri-
ate Team Mascots."'
What is striking about these examples is that the reporters'
text provides the moral language and the headline writers proceed
to avoid it. The mausoleum and team-mascot examples in particu-
lar show how word-users have found a way to express and at the
same time evade moral judgment. That modern development pro-
vokes this Essay. We are particularly interested in the use of the
A-word in American discourse in the place of old moral words
such as "bad" (or "good"), "wrong" (or "right"), "sinful" (or "vir-
tuous"), and "outside" (or "within") the law. The time may come
when someone writes an essay like this, and asks, to paraphrase
6. To "Out" or Not to "Out": The Press Wrestles With a Thorny Issue: When is it
Appropriate to Reveal the Private Lives of Public Officials?, TIME, Aug. 19, 1991, at 17.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. TIME INT'L, July 30, 1990, at 19.
10. Franz Lidz, Not a Very Sporting Symbo" Indians Have Ceased to Be Appropriate
Team Mascots, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Sept. 17, 1990, at 11. Another offending headline is
found in the Indiana Code of Judicial Conduct, over text that never mentions the A-
word: "A Judge or Judicial Candidate Shall Refrain from Inappropriate Political Activi-
ty." IND. CODE OF JUD. CONDucT Canon 5 (1989).
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Karl Menninger:" "Whatever Became of 'Inappropriate?"' We
hasten to make our contribution before that happens.
First, we venture a survey of the more common modem uses
of the word; then an extended discussion of a representative legal
context-sexual harassment; then a theory of where this modem
usage plugs into moral reasoning (ethics); and, to conclude, a
suggestion on how to interpret "appropriate" when we are able to
take it seriously in ethics and in jurisprudence.
I. FouR WAYS "APPROPRIATE" IS USED THBESE DAYS
A. "Appropriate" Meaning "Distinctive"
The second edition of the Oxford English Dictionary gives
five traditional meanings for the adjective "appropriate." The sec-
ond, third, and fourth are "[b]elonging to oneself," "[a]ssigned to
a particular person," and "[a]ttached or belonging as an attribute
[or] quality."' In this sense, a member of a women's club in
Danville, Virginia-an old and elite organization-complained that,
"People sometimes suggest inappropriate speakers."13 The Society
of Jesus, addressing their new agenda for "collaboration with the
laity in mission,' encourages "participative decision-making where
it is appropriate," that is, when the decision at hand is not one re-
served to itself by the unmarried male clergy, who are, by decree,
distinctive when it comes to ecclesiastical policymaking.Y4 And an
expert on dogs faced up to the charge that "Benji... barks inap-
propriately" by explaining that "[h]e's barking because he's trying
to tell you something. You just don't know what it is."'" Experts
on automobiles understand that cars, like dogs, are not distinctive-
ly rude, because they are not capable of being rude.16 If a car's
11. See KARL MENNINGER, WHATEVER BECAME OF SiN? (1973).
12. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 3, at 586-87. Louis Auchincloss's Fel-
low Passengers illustrates this meaning in describing Clement Ludlow, Wall Street estate-
tax lawyer: "His gentleness, equanimity, and mild formal good manners seemed appropri-
ate to his slight, straight build and to the air of shadowy grayness on his grave, narrow,
but still handsome face." Louis AuciNCLoss, FELLOW PASSENGERS 148 (1989).
13. Rheta Grimsley Johnson, "Wednesday Club" Carries on Tradition, SOUTH BEND
TRm., Feb. 19, 1995, at F3.
14. THE SOCIETY OF JESUS, COLLABORATION WITH THE LAITY IN MISSION, quoted
in NAT'L CATHOLIC REP., Apr. 7, 1995, at 13.
15. Alisa Mullins, Doggie Do's and Don'ts, SOUTH BEND TRm., Aug. 2, 1995, at D1.
16. See Tom & Ray Magliozzi, SOuTH BEND TRIB., July 30, 1995, Automotion Sec-
tion, at 2 (column).
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horn honks "inappropriately," it is because "the contacts in your
[car's] steering column are probably all worn out."'7
Anne Tyler, who never descends to the hackneyed uninten-
tionally, has a scene in her novel Ladder of Years, in which Delia,
the protagonist, a self-effacing woman from Maryland, is talked
into pretending that she is the estranged wife of a man Delia
encounters in a supermarket; the man has seen that his girlfriend
is coming up the aisle, and he wants to make her jealous. When
the charade is over, the man thanks Delia, and Delia says, "It was
nothing. I just wish there'd been, oh, somebody really appropri-
ate. .... you know, as glamorous as your wife.' 8
When it is behavior that is appropriate-as-distinctive, the
adjective's meaning tends to shade into moral judgment. The Jesu-
it moral theologian Thomas L. Schubeck, in writing about libera-
tion theology, is thus careful not to accuse Father Gustavo Gutier-
rez of misusing the Bible; Gutierrez, Father Schubeck says, "does
not demand from the Bible answers to inappropriate questions,
such as biblical guidelines for governing guerrilla warfare."' 9 It is
not that the Bible-a distinctive source-lacks content that would
speak to the conduct of warfare, but, we infer, that an attempt to
use that content to justify guerrilla warfare would be a misuse-an
immoral use, even-of the distinctive character of scripture.
Medicine abounds with instances of usage that straddle the
appropriate-as-distinctive category and the appropriate-as-moral
category. For example, the mother of a two-year-old wrote to Dr.
Allan Bruckheim, author of a "Family Doctor" newspaper column,
complaining about an emergency-room physician who had been
rude to her when she reported that her child had "stuffed a small
calculator battery up his nose."'" Dr. Bruckheim ruled that "the
17. Id.
18. ANNE TYLER, LADDER OF YEARs 13-14 (1995).
19. THOMAS L. SCHUBECK, SJ., LIBERATION ETHics 169 (1993).
20. The moral justification of violence to bring about liberation is a tender question
in liberation theology. See id. at 68-75 (evaluating moral theologian Juan Luis Segundo's
contention that not all decisions to use violence are morally wrong). Tom Brokaw was, in
this straddling way, congratulated by a fellow journalist for behaving well when he repre-
sented the United States in a 1987 conversation with Mikhail Gorbachev: "Brokaw's
behavior was . . . for the occasion quite appropriate. It was a welcome relief from those
television news performers who through hyperconfidence or gall treat everyone they face
as their intellectual equals (or perhaps inferiors)." Thomas Griffith, High Moments in a
Low Key, TIME, Dec. 14, 1987, at 68.
21. Dr. Allan Bruckheim, Prevention is the Best Cure for Painful Hangnails, CHL
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concern you sensed in the physician was appropriate," because the
situation was both common and serious.' He did seem, though,
to miss the point of the woman's question. She had written that
the physician "made a bigger thing gut of this than necessary....
[He really made me feel bad."'  The issue, she argued, was a
moral issue; it is immoral to make people feel bad over trifles. Dr.
Bruckheim understood the issue to be about what is distinctive to
medical art and what is not. If he had been alert to his calling he
might have provided a clearer example of the fact that science
typically aspires to use the A-word more carefully than popular
culture does.24
TRWB., July 10, 1995, § 5, at 3.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. "In test-tube experiments, the herb stimulated healthy cells to produce an anti.
cancer substance called tumor necrosis factor-alpha. An appropriate dose, they reported,
could some day prove useful against cancer." Doug Podolsky, A New Age of Healing
Hands: Cancer Centers Embrace Alternative Therapies as "Complimentary Care", U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 5, 1996, at 71. It is hard to mistake what the author means
when he tells us about an "appropriate dose": an amount that is safe, that works, that
other scientists accept. Similarly, we know what authors mean when they say: "Review of
fluid intake for community-dwelling seniors is appropriate to incorporate into office and
home visits in order to properly assess . . . risk factors [including hot weather and lack
of access to regular medical care]. Community health fairs may be appropriate sites to
educate older individuals on the importance of hydration to their overall health." Andrew
D. Weinberg & Kenneth L. Minaker, Dehydration. Evaluation and Management in Older
Adults, 274 JAMA 1552, 1553 (1995).
Other, less careful authors use "appropriate" to describe moral issues in the life-
support/euthanasia context. Walter Farquharson, the former moderator of the United
Church of Canada, said: "We believe that it is appropriate to withdraw medical treat-
ments that are not benefiting the patient and that are prolonging suffering and dying
when the competent patient decides and when... firm evidence of disease irreversibility
exists.... We do not believe, however, that legalization of assisted suicide is justified."
Harms F. Skoutajan, Post-sacred Society, 112 CHRISTIAN CENTURY 948, 950 (1995).
Francine Arsenault, Chairperson of the Council of Canadians with Disabilities, comment-
ed after a court's ruling on a father's assistance in his daughter's suicide that "[w]e can-
not support [his] claim that he had the legal right to decided [sic] to commit suicide for
his daughter. The verdict of the jury and sentence of the court are just and appropriate.
To do otherwise is to say that the life of a person with a disability is not equal to that
of someone non-disabled." Id. It is certainly important to distinguish between withholding
medical procedures and physician-assisted suicide. But announcing that one behavior or
the other is "appropriate" does not do that job. In contrast to the more careful medical
use of the A-word, these examples showcase moralists who cannot explain their moral
judgments.
When medical professionals deal with one another, they use "appropriate" as in
etiquette, but in doing so they also invoke medicine's take on professionalism. For exam-
ple: "Inappropriate and Appropriate Selection of 'Peers' in Grant Review." 272 JAMA
114 (1994). Another article discusses the "inappropriate" use of prescription drugs by the
"APPROPRIATE"
B. "Appropriate" Meaning "Proper"
"Appropriate" is often used to express amateur judgments in
etiquette. It is rarely used by the experts, and almost never by
Miss Manners herself. She doesn't need it, for example, when she
describes the relevant distinction with regard to changing Ameri-
can mores on smoking: "When smoking habits were considered a
matter of etiquette, smokers (known then as 'gentlemen') were
easily kept from annoying nonsmokers (known as 'ladies'). Now
that it is treated as a moral problem, the smokers and nonsmokers
are using not just smoke but emotional fire to kill one anoth-
er. 2S
Lawrence Block presents a disturbing case. He wins, and
deserves to win, prizes for his Matthew Scudder crime novels, but
he has lately drifted into hackneyed use of the A-word. He uses it
five times in A Long Line of Dead Men. In three instances he
uses it to mean "proper," but his use is vague and without ade-
quate context. Block's story involves an odd men's club which
meets once a year to see which of them have died. Soon after the
club's founding (established to replace a similar club which de-
cined as no one was left to come to the meetings), a question
arises about whether members should attend the funerals of re-
cently-dead members. Some attend, some don't. One member
"wasn't coming" to the funeral of the first member to die, another
member explains. "[Hie didn't think it was appropriate. ' ' 6
A majority of members of the club agrees not to provide "a
case of good Bordeaux for the last man to drink. We decided
whoever was left would be too old to enjoy it. Besides, it seemed
inappropriate, even frivolous."' Both of these instances are more
elderly, allegedly causing $20 billion worth of otherwise unnecessary hospitalizations each
year. Here, "inappropriate" means that the prescribing physician committed an error. See
Harry Rosenthal, Drug Interactions Cause Big Problems, SOUTH BEND TRi., Sept. 17,
1995, at F9 ("The medical community belatedly is emphasizing the need to increase
physicians' knowledge of geriatrics and elderly clinical pharmacology.").
25. JUDiTH MARTIN, COMMON COURTESY: IN WmIcH Miss MANNERS SOLVES THE
PROBLEM THAT BAFFLED MR. JEFFERSON 26 (1985). Criticisms of humor with the levity
of a "lead balloon" are probably the purest form of amateur etiquette judgment. Con-
sider the newspaper column a fond adult daughter wrote for her father on Father's Day:
"His raucous jokes-often wholly inappropriate-are the sign of a man who refuses to
stand on ceremony." Lisa Bornstein, One: A Father's Real Gifts Intangible, SOUTH BEND
TRMI., June 12, 1995, at B1.
26. LAWRENCE BLOCK, A LONG LiNE OF DEAD MEN 30 (1994).
27. Xd at 116.
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sensitive reactions than that of a chauffeur for one of the mem-
bers, who neglects to thank Matt Scudder for giving him a mes-
sage: "He shot me a guarded look; he was glad to have the infor-
mation but didn't think it was appropriate for me to talk to
him."' Some mystery writers do better. Carl Hiaasen, as nearly
as we can find, uses the A-word only once in Double Whammy,
and we are reluctant to fault him for it: "[Decker, the detective]
tried to remember the polite thing to say when a beautiful strang-
er struck up a conversation about oral sex. None of the obvious
replies seemed appropriate for a funeral.
29
The differences between Block and Hiaasen here are twofold:
not only does Hiassen 1) explain Decker's judgment about what is
proper, but he 2) does so by providing a context for his use of the
A-word. Block's "Dead Man's Club" is bizarre-its moral purposes
are obscure; its social purposes macabre. For a member of the
club to say it is not "appropriate" for survivor members to attend
the funeral of one who dies, nor for the club to keep wine for the
last to die, doesn't tell the reader anything at all. Why not attend
the funeral or provide the case of wine?3" It is impossible to tell
what the purposes are, social or moral, without a context. Context,
as we hope to show,31 makes all the difference.
What is proper is rarely precisely what is moral. Thus the
mother of a nursing student wrote to Ann Landers, worried about
the fact that a guidance counselor at the nursing school was carry-
ing on with one of the instructors. That may have been something
law, morals, or etiquette should take account of, but that was not
the subject of "Missouri Mother's" question: "I am tempted to
inform the authorities... but I don't want to act inappropriately
and perhaps get my daughter in trouble."32 This example is un-
usual in the clarity with which it attempts to show a difference be-
tween the purely proper-the stuff of mere etiquette-and proper-
meaning-moral. Missouri Mother's question has to do with propri-
ety; she is simply asking how to deal with physicians and their
cohorts. She does not doubt her own moral judgment.
28. Id. at 184. We doubt that the chauffeur would have put it that way.
29. CARL HiAAsEN, DOUBLE WHAMMY 44 (1987).
30. Both sound like good ideas to us, suggesting that maybe, given context, the
members of the club would be some sort of support group.
31. See infra Part m.
32. Ann Landers, 1978 Poem Still Appropriate for Mother's Day, SOUTH BEND TRm.,
May 14, 1995, at F3.
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The distinction between the proper and the moral is rarely
that clear, even if judgments regarding propriety seem to be in
tension with moral judgments that affirm individualism (as Ms.
Provenzano's judgment on the nudity of Ms. Bevilacqua did, which
probably shows that the ethics of radical individualism are inade-
quate, when not vacuous). Judgments of propriety-of an action's
conformity to etiquette-are affirmations of communal behavior
norms. Miss Manners demonstrates this when she writes, using the
A-word carefully, about how a stranger should behave in a com-
munity that is not her own: "The overriding requirements of a
polite person from any culture or subculture are: to have the
sense to use the appropriate forms at the appropriate time and
occasion."33 Moral judgments, she realizes, are different: "Bigotry
is rude. (Practicing it is immoral, but expressing it is rude.)"'
Miss Manners illustrates here the capacity of moral language to
state a moral question clearly-and the felicity of avoiding the A-
word in doing so.35
This section has become a discussion of three things: 1) judg-
ments of propriety3 6 (which is what Miss Manners is paid for); 2)
related, if undisclosed, communal moral judgments (which Miss
Manners often makes and sometimes tries to hide); and 3) the
blurring of both sorts of judgment by invoking the A-word instead
of using either old, sound words of judgment, or explanation, or
both. (Blurring weakens the ethical significance of a mixed judg-
33. Judith Martin, "Cultural Tradition" Veils Rude Practices, SOUTH BEND TRI.,
Aug. 13, 1995, at F3. It is relatively common for Miss Manners' correspondents to ask
about what is appropriate, to which she fashions an answer that avoids talking about
what is "appropriate"-or at least avoids using the word. One young man, for example,
asked with regard to a young woman he sometimes talked to at the gym, "Is it appro-
priate for me to ask her out... ? How do you rate the gym as a place to meet ....
[Miss Manners said,] Better than the bar, a lot better than the bar exam .... ." Judith
Martin, Nose Ring Not Appropriate for Doctor, SOUTH BEND TRiB., Nov. 6, 1996, at D2.
The local headline writer, alas, was not so careful.
34. Judith Martin, In P.C.-Driven World, There are 2 Kinds, SOUTH BEND TRIB.,
June 25, 1995, at F3.
35. In this case, though, given a clear issue expressed clearly, she was wrong. If you
attend to the moral importance of community, it is immoral to express bigotry; such ex-
pression invites others in the community to become bigots and violates the scriptural
injunction to "stir one another up to love and good works." Hebrews 10:23-24.
36. It is of passing interest that Adam Smith characterized Plato's moral philosophy
as the ethics of propriety. See ADAM SMrriH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS
267-70 (Liberty Classics ed. 1976) (1759).
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ment of this sort. If the A-word can be used without blurring, as
we hope to show, it can signal an interesting ethical argument.)
An example is Miss Manners' judgment regarding whether
it is a violation of sound etiquette to throw food at sporting
events? 7 First she attends to the argument her correspondent in-
vited, about propriety: "The respectable argument is that this is a
tradition which is part of a community ritual and that it is within
the realm of acceptable behavior for the situation."3 We classify
that as a communal argument about propriety, invoking context as
a method of explanation. If Miss Manners' sardonic tone implies a
moral judgment, it is muted if not hidden. Not for long, however.
"But," she then says, "not every tradition, however entrenched, is
attractive. Some should be closed down immediately. Miss Man-
ners could tell you of ancient wedding traditions that would make
your hair stand on end."39
Ritualistic practices may be (merely) improper; they may also
be immoral. Miss Manners argues that throwing food is both im-
proper and immoral. She notices that the tradition that appears to
regard the unattractive behavior as proper may also harbor a
deeper strain that rules it out: "Ancient cities that have traditions
of carnivals and other whoopee occasions on which wild behavior
is tolerated also have their deeply imbedded rules about what
cannot be done, as uninformed tourists sometimes find out the
hard way."140 Miss Manners also argues that throwing food is of-
fensive and hence immoral, and backs the argument by referring
to an advertent, communal, moral judgment: "Those who engage
in the tradition of derisive shouting hear about it from both fellow
fans and players when they overstep the acceptably insulting vo-
cabulary. What is offensive to much of the participating communi-
ty cannot be allowed."4' The morality there is as clear and as
elementary as the Golden Rule. It is the basis for etiquette, even
if we concede to Miss Manners that many breaches of etiquette
are, in themselves, not moral matters.
Lawrence Block's A Long Line of Dead Men contains two
examples where the A-word straddles the proper and the moral,
37. See Judith Martin, Tossing Tortillas a No-no at Sport Events, SOUTH BEND TRIB.,
Dec. 17, 1995, at F3.
38. Id.
39. Id
40. Id.
41. Id.
["Vol. 46:781
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both more interesting for ethics than the three examples from
Block's novel that we quoted above.42 At the end of the story,
after the killer has been attended to (but is not dead), Matt
Scudder is asked to join the club (which, please recall, is a club
that meets once a year to notice which of its members have died).
"We have never taken in a new member before," the inviter says,
"and we've never replaced members who have died, because that
would be contrary to our whole design. But this would be a case
of replacing a member who has not died, and it seems curiously
appropriate."'43 It is appropriate-the proper thing to do, but also
the right (and even creative) thing to do-because Matt has fin-
gered the member who was the killer and is in line for recognition
and reward. Context provides the ethical explanation. Matt de-
clines the offer, though; perhaps the inviter could have used a
more persuasive word.
The other example from Block, near the border between the
proper and the moral, occurs earlier in the story when Matt is
employed by the club to seek the killer. Members do not want the
investigation revealed to the police, but private investigators who
are not licensed (Matt Scudder's situation) are not able to with-
hold information from the police if the police ask for it. The solu-
tion is that one of the members, who is a lawyer, formally em-
ploys Matt, which extends the lawyer-client privilege to Matt as
the lawyer's investigator. That satisfies the members. It does not
make any difference to Matt. "If I should feel it was appropriate
for me to withhold information from the police, I'd do it irrespec-
tive of the legal ramifications."'  There is no explanation and no
context with which to determine whether, by "appropriate," Scud-
42. See BLOCK, supra note 26, at 186, 284.
43. Id. at 284.
44. Id. at 186. One way to notice the use of the A-word to mean proper and to
notice as well the communal character of such a judgment is to guess where a good writ-
er might have used the A-word, but, being a good writer, did not. Miss Manners is so
adept, in both respects, that her correspondents tend to write better English than, say,
the correspondents of medical columnists or Ann Landers and Abigail Van Buren. One
of Miss Manners' correspondents, for example, complained of a legislator who, during a
public hearing, noticed the presence of the writer and other members of a delegation of
women, and said, "'Mr. Chairman, we've got a lovely group of ladies here. We thank
you for your presence. I have no questions.'" Judith Martin, Disarm Trivialization with
Savvy Response, SouTH BEND TRI., Aug. 9, 1995, at D2. The writer asked if that be-
havior was "correct" and "proper." Id A lesser writer, subject to a lesser judge, might
have accused the legislator of inappropriateness.
1997]
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der meant "proper" or-more likely-"right." Matt, like Ms. Pro-
venzano, is a person you have to know before you can understand
what he is talking about.
C. "Appropriate" Meaning "Moral"
The Associated Press reported in April that a number of
works of art were removed from an exhibit in Muskegon, Michi-
gan, "after some people in the building where it was displayed
complained it contained 'inappropriate' nudity."'45 With a sensitiv-
ity for elegance rare among modem American journalists, the
anonymous reporter, using quotation marks, identified a moral
agenda: "Bettye Clark Cannon, gallery namesake and its major
underwriter, said she supported the action to remove [the works
of art].. .. 'I have no problem with nudity, but this was lewd
nudity, degrading women,' she said." 6 Senator Charles Robb,
according to the press, "confessed to behavior 'not appropriate for
a married man.' (He insists he always stopped short of inter-
course.)"'47 Egalitarian progress among the young moved the edi-
tor of a high-school yearbook in Cromwell, Connecticut, to excise
the "most-likely-to-succeed" superlative. "I don't think it fits," she
said. "I don't think it's appropriate."
Sissela Bok, writer of books on the morals of lying and of
secrecy-studies that manage to be both popular and learned-
uses the A-word with uncommon discretion, and uses it to express
moral judgments on the ethics of lying to those not entitled to the
45. Complaints Spur Order to Remove Art With Nudes, SOUTH BEND TRI., Apr. 22,
1995, at A3.
46. Id. There is a similar serious note in using the A-word in deliberation about
morals-that is, in meta-ethics. Father Schubeck quotes the moral theologian Dennis
McCann, who argues that the theologian Juan Luis Segundo is a utilitarian (a bad word
in Roman Catholic religious ethics): "In principle there are no means that are intrinsical-
ly inappropriate to the struggle for liberation." ScHuECK, supra note 19, at 74 (quoting
DENNIS MCCANN, CHRISTIAN REALISM AND LIBERATION THEOLOGY: PRACTICAL T-E-
OLOGIES IN CREATIVE CoNFLcr 225 (1981)). We note again that approval of violence is
a tender subject in liberation ethics. Professor McCann was sticking his neck out-which
is Father Schubeck's point. By the way, Father Segundo, who narrowly missed being
murdered when eight other people were slaughtered at a mission in San Salvador, admits
that there are inappropriate means in the struggle for liberation. See SCHUBECK, supra
note 19, at 253 (observing that Segundo condemned guerrilla warfare in Uruguay in the
1970s).
47. Paul Anderson, Tarnished Opponents: A Confessed Liar and a Womanizer Lead
U.S. Senate Race in Virginia, DETROrr FREE PRESS, Apr. 8, 1994, at 5A.
48. Superlatives Ended in School Yearbook, SOUTH BEND TRm., Nov. 3, 1996, at A7.
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truth (an old category in the casuistry of truthfulness). Bok's ethi-
cal reasoning goes like this: 1) it is wrong to reveal secrets; 2)
people who are trying not to reveal secrets may have to resort to
telling lies; 3) their telling lies, in this circumstance, is not neces-
sarily immoral, particularly when 4) the person seeking the infor-
mation is not entitled to it, and 5) this person's requesting the
information, when he is not entitled to it, may be wrong also.
"The line between appropriate and inappropriate requests for
information may shift from one society to another and be revised
over time; but wherever the line is drawn, those charged with
secrets have to decide how best to protect them."49 This is a deft
analysis of the example we two lawyers bring from our widely
separated childhoods: "Is your mother at home?" "No," we an-
swered, when she was at home, but, we were taught to think, "not
to you.
50
D. "Appropriate" Meaning "Legal"
The use of "appropriate" as a substitute for "legal" is com-
mon in the law these days, in imprecise judgments about both
legal procedure and legal substance. Thus one Indiana lawyer,
representing a woman who filed a notice of claim for sexual ha-
rassment with the Attorney General of Indiana, said her client
"wants ... to be compensated for her losses and for the damage
she has incurred .... to make sure [the employer] deals with the
problem appropriately."'" Doing so would resolve .not only the
moral and mannerly difficulties, but also the legal dispute. In
another and later newspaper story, the same lawyer, representing
another complainant against the same employer, involving the
same supervisor, was reported to have said, "The harassment was
inappropriate" and that the supervisor "engaged in inappropriate
comments ... of a sexual nature. 52
One wonders why the behavior the lawyer describes is not
called, simply, "wrong"-or, as the context would seem to require,
49. SISSELA BoK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE 148 (1978).
50. See Thomas L. Shaffer, On Lying for Clients, 71 NOTRE DAME L REV. 195, 210
(1996).
51. Michael A. Slatin, Employee's Complaint Names Cohen, SOUTH BEND TRm., May
13, 1995, at Al (quoting attorney Brian . Hurley).
52. Michael A. Slatin, Third Woman Accuses Cohen, SOUTH BEND TRiB., June 2,
1995, at Al (quoting attorney Brian J. Hurley).
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"illegal." This opaque usage is hardly unusual among lawyers and
judges as well as in "lay" discussion. When lawyers use the A-
word to talk about law, they almost always could have used "le-
gal" instead and with more clarity. The Indiana Court of Appeals,
for example, in a burglary case in which the voluntariness of the
defendant's confession was at issue, referred to "Officer House's
inappropriate questioning techniques." 53 That court used the A-
word in the same (substantive legal) way when it reviewed a crim-
inal sentence imposed by a trial judge: "[T]he consecutive sentenc-
es were inappropriate in the present case."' Hundreds of law
journal articles use the A-word in the titles; such titles, like news-
paper and magazine headlines, tend to be more hackneyed than
what is in the articles.5
A lawyer for Bernard Nussbaum, defending Mr. Nussbaum's
conduct as the lawyer for President and Mrs. Clinton, after the
death in the White House of Vincent Foster, said: "Mr. Nuss-
baum's testimony will make it clear that he acted in a perfectly
appropriate way."56 That is, apparently, in a legal way, in the
way prescribed by what has come to be called "the law on law-
yers.2M The A-word, used to express a legal judgment regarding
a lawyer's behavior (a legal judgment that is for some reason
called ethical) has become familiar in writing in that expanding,
post-Watergate field; one writer shows both sides of the word
choice we are talking about here when he equates "appropriate
standards" with rejecting "a principal-agent/hired gun model of
lawyering. '58
53. Sevits v. State, 651 N.E.2d 278, 281 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995). The Indiana court did
better, we think, when it directed trial judges to consider context in exercising discretion
in drafting marital property in dissolution cases: "Reversal of the trial court's decision is
appropriate only where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and
circumstances." Simpson v. Simpson, 650 N.E.2d 333, 335 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (emphasis
added). Trial judges will avoid reversal in such cases by explicating logic, effect, facts,
and circumstances, which is what the trial judge did in Simpson.
54. Robertson v. State, 650 N.E.2d 1177, 1185 (ind. Ct. App. 1995); see also Schiro
v. State, 669 N.E.2d 1357 (Ind. 1996) (indicating when the death sentence is "appropri-
ate").
55. See, eg., Amy Sabrin, Thinking About Content: Can It Play An Appropriate Role
in Government Funding of the Arts?, 102 YALE LJ. 1209 (1993); see also infra notes 58,
61 & 67.
56. Pete Yost, Restrictions Defended- Nussbaum Action in Foster Case Seen Appropri-
ate, SOUTH BEND TRIB., Aug. 9, 1995, at A5.
57. See THOMAS L SHAFMR & MARY M. SHAFER, AmERICAN LAWYERS AND
THEIR COMMUNrMS 1-8 (1991).
58. Myron C. Grauer, What's Wrong With This Picture?. The Tension Between Ana-
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An opinion of the American Bar Association's ethics commit-
tee on contingent fees, which used the A-word throughout, strove
to describe a fee that "is appropriate in the circumstances and
reasonable in amount. '59 This was a reference to general rules on
fees charged by lawyers, which require that such fees be "reason-
able," and a vacuous way to suggest other criteria; sometimes the
A-word was used to say that contingent fees are reasonable, and
sometimes it was used to refer to fees that are reasonable without
considering whether they are contingent. In another opinion, in
1993, the same ABA committee addressed settlement conferences
that are presided over by judges. May such a judge legally (or
"ethically") ask one of the lawyers about settlement authority
given in confidence to the lawyer by the lawyer's client? The
committee said no: "It is not appropriate for the judge to compel
lawyers to make confidential admissions which may be against
their clients' interests."'
The A-word may arise more often, as in these committee
opinion instances, when the context is "legal ethics" (that is, the
law on lawyers) than when the context is another kind of law. If
that is the case, the tendency may signal a thoughtful choice of
this word, rather than older "legal ethics" words such as "wrong,"
"bad," "immoral," "unprofessional," "unethical," or "illegal." And
if that is so, this Essay may have happened on to something inter-
esting: that deliberate use of the A-word is indicative of a reliance
by "the law on lawyers" on a cultural ethic of individualism and
lytical Premises and Appropriate Standards for Tax Practitioners, 20 CAP. U. L. Rlv. 353,
356-57 (1991).
59. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 389 (1994)
(discussing contingent fees). A class-action consumer lawyer in Houston, for instance,
asked for fees amounting to two-thirds of the damages awarded. An alert reporter inter-
viewed other lawyers, one of whom ruled the request "inappropriate," without explaining
why. Others who responded to the reporter's question gave no more context but used
moral words which, perhaps, carry a context of their own. One called the fee "the gross-
est sort of overreaching"; another "way too big"; and a third "almost scandalous." Mike
Tolson, Attorney Fees: How Much is Too Much?, HousTON CHRON., Oct. 21, 1996, at
A13.
60. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 370 (1993)
(discussing judicial participation in pretrial settlement negotiations). The State Bar of
Michigan Standing Committee on Professional and Judicial Ethics followed suit when it
examined Michigan statutes to see if it was all right for a judge to give legal advice to
members of her family, the legal issue, the committee said, was "whether the behavior at
issue is appropriate." State Bar of Michigan Standing Comm. on Professional and Judicial
Ethics, Op. JI-77 (1993).
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autonomous moral agency. Otherwise, the preceding legal exam-
ples make lawyers' and judges' use of the A-word appear empty.
But when, in legal literature, the word is used as a label and
placed in context, or when it is used as a bridge to connect moral
and legal reasoning, it seems to serve an intelligible purpose-or
at least it, like chicken soup when you have a cold, seems not to
do any harm. There are, we think, three categories of coherent use
of the A-word in the law:
1. The A-word as a Label. Judicial opinions and academic
discussions on attorneys' fees are an example. Here the legal
writer uses "appropriate," often in a policy-based analysis, to
signal rather than to explain (since the word does not by itself
explain anything). Thus, in discussing whether plaintiffs who
prevail under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA) should receive attorneys' fees, as an analogy to fees
awarded in civil-rights litigation, an academic author said the
analogy is "appropriate" for fees for defendants, but "inappropri-
ate" for fees for plaintiffs, and then provided analysis based partly
on the notion of private attorneys general and partly on the policy
of discouraging frivolous lawsuits.6' This jurisprudential use of the
word is not utterly awful because it is connected to a context-so
that "fees are appropriate," for example, is not quite a statement
ex cathedra. It adds little or nothing to the quality of the argu-
ment, but it gives the author a way to get started or to stop or
both-one thinks of Christopher Robin's friend, who said, "[Either
that is so] or my name's not Winnie-the-Pooh ... [w]hich it is
... [s]o there you are." 62
2. The A-word as a Bridge Between the Legal and the Moral.
Uses of the A-word in cases where the law being analyzed rests
on moral judgment are more defensible than uses of it merely as
a label or an argument-stopper, perhaps because in those cases
"appropriate" serves as a bridge between legal and moral analysis.
An example can be found in the literature on whether it is
defensible for a tax lawyer to advise her client to exploit the
"audit lottery" and take a chance with fatuous or dishonest claims
61. See Mark Howard Berlind, Attorney's Fees Under ERISA: When Is an Award
Appropriate?, 71 CORNELL L. REv. 1037 (1986).
62. A.A. MILNE, WINNm-THE-POOH 48 (E.P. Dutton & Co. 1974 (1926)).
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on a tax return.' Some standards of practice are said to be
appropriate (that is, morally defensible as well as defensible under
"the law on lawyers" or tax regulations or both or all three) and
some are not. When using "appropriate" as a bridge, though, it is
necessary to be clear, and one way to be clear is to offer context,
as Jeffrey Barker did in an essay entitled, "Professional-Client Sex:
Is Criminal Liability an Appropriate Means of Enforcing Profess-
ional Responsibility?" ' 4
3. The A-word in Statutes. Judges and lawyers who have to
cope with the A-word in a statute are in a third situation. They
attempt to provide a coherent meaning for the A-word because
the nature of statutory interpretation requires it. In the fees
context, for example, the Clean Air Act provides that "[t]he
court... may award costs of litigation (including reasonable
attorney and expert witness fees) to any party, whenever the court
determines such award is appropriate."' Congress may as well
have put a period after "party." In an attempt at clarification, the
Supreme Court did not offer a global definition of the word that
Congress (no doubt purposefully) did not define, but it did say
such things as: "[A]bsent some degree of success on the merits by
the claimant, it is not 'appropriate' for a federal court to award
attorney's fees .... " An academic commentator had to provide
the policy considerations.'
63. See, eg., Grauer, supra note 58, at 357--64 (arguing that it is inappropriate to use
the litigation standard of zealous advocacy for the attorney's role as tax advisor).
64. 40 U.C.LA. L REv. 1275 (1993).
65. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(d) (1994).
66. Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 694 (1983).
67. See Walter B. Russell, III, & Paul Thomas Gregory, Awards of Attorney's Fees
in Environmental Litigation. Citizen Suits and the "Appropriate" Standard, 18 GA. L.
REV. 307 (1984). Article 63(1) of the American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22,
1969, in ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, BASIC DOCuMENTS PERTAINING TO
HUMAN RIGHTS IN TkE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM 48 (1988), provides that "the Court
shall ... also rule, if appropriate, that ... fair compensation be paid to the injured
party." By contrast, Article 50 of the European Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 4,
1950, in BASIC DOCUMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 207 (Ian Brownlie ed., 1967), pro-
vides, "the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party." The for-
mer document consulted the latter, but neither set of drafters explained the former's use
of the A-word to guide international jurists. "Necessary" is probably more useful than
"appropriate." We are indebted to Professor Dinah Shelton for pointing us to this inter-
esting difference.
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II. A CLOSER LOOK AT A LEGAL CONTEXT:
SEXUAL HARASSMENT
Careful use of the word "appropriate" is especially important
in the law because people need to be able to predict the legal
consequences of their behavior. An example that justifies some-
what extended analysis in this Essay arises in the developing law
on sexual harassment.
In the landmark case Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,' the
United States Supreme Court endeavored to clarify sexual discrim-
ination jurisprudence, citing guidelines from the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) that specified that sexual
harassment is a form of sexual discrimination prohibited by Title
VI.'69 The court noted that the guidelines defined sexual harass-
ment by describing the kinds of conduct in the workplace that
may be actionable under Title VII. Unlawful actions under the
guidelines included "(u)nwelcome sexual advances, requests for
sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual
nature."70 Following the EEOC's admirable example, the Court
avoided using "inappropriate," and instead declared: "The grava-
men of any sexual harassment claim is that the alleged sexual
advances were 'unwelcome."'71
Despite the good example of the Meritor Court and the
EEOC Guidelines, the Supreme Court blurred the line of demar-
cation for illegal conduct constituting sexual harassment in its 1993
decision Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.72 In Harris, the Court
affirmed Meritor's standards, but, in an apparent attempt to clarify
things, declared that the standard "takes a middle path between
making actionable conduct that is merely offensive and requiring
the conduct to cause a tangible psychological injury."73 Harris
also held that in order to be actionable as an "abusive work envi-
ronment," conduct need not go so far as to "seriously affect [the
68. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
69. Id. at 65 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1985)).
70. Id. at 65 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)).
71. Id at 68 (emphasis added). In Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield,
490 U.S. 30, 54 (1989), the Court was less astute, saying it "must defer to the experi-
ence, wisdom, and compassion of the ... tribal council to fashion an appropriate reme-
dy" (quoting In re Adoption of Halloway, 732 P.2d 962, 972 (Utah 1986)).
72. 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
73. Id. at 21.
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plaintiff's] psychological well-being" or lead to actual injury.7 4 In
the wake of Harris, one commentator has observed, "It's clear
that harassment law restricts speech. What's not clear is which
kinds of speech the law prohibits, and which kinds can still legally
be said."'
As a consequence of this imprecision, lesser courts have (pre-
dictably) fallen back on the A-word to describe conduct they
mean to condemn. For example, in Oslin v. State,76 former em-
ployees of a state treatment center sued the state under a number
of theories, alleging damages arising from a supervisor's conduct.
The judges in Minnesota noted that the supervisor engaged in
"inappropriate behavior" when he beckoned one plaintiff,
"grabbed her, touched the sides of her breasts, stated 'you are one
hell of a woman,' and kissed her on the lips,"' to which she
responded by pushing the supervisor away and stating that "this
isn't right." 8 Another incident which the court counted as "inap-
propriate behavior" involved the supervisor grabbing the inside of
the employee's leg, sliding his hand up her leg, and grasping her
groin area."9 The court further classified as "inappropriate" the
supervisor's retaliation against another employee after she had
filed a charge of sex discrimination! °
Although it is clear that the judge in Oslin regarded all three
incidents of behavior as "inappropriate," and, if true as alleged,
illegal, this perhaps would not be the case were another judge
presiding. For example, in Randi W. v. Livingston Union School
District,l California judges extended the misuse of the A-word to
describe sexual abuse in school. The case involved a victim's ac-
tion against school authorities who recommended a former em-
ployee for a position at another school, despite their knowledge of
the employee's propensity for molesting female students.' The
employee at issue had allegedly "touched, molested, and engaged
74. Id. at 22.
75. Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Appellate Review in Workplace Harass-
ment Cases, 90 Nw. U. L. REv. 1009, 1012 (1996).
76. 543 N.W.2d 408 (Mlnn. Ct. App. 1996).
77. Id. at 411.
78. Id.
79. See id.
80. See id. Such retaliation clearly violates Title VII and thus could have been sim-
ply termed "illegal." See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1994).
81. 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 471, reprinted at 50 Cal. App. 4th 1570 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).
82. See id at 473.
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in sexual touching of [a] 13-year old.' '8 Later in the opinion, the
court characterized an employee's sexual overtures to students as
"prior inappropriate conduct."'84 We wonder (in both senses of
the verb): does inappropriate behavior mean the same thing as
molestation, or does a molestation victim need to show more than
"inappropriate" conduct to prevail on his or her claim?
A federal district court in Georgia distinguished a police
lieutenant's "alleged sexual harassment" of three subordinates
from "inappropriate behavior" toward another. In Bosley v.
Kearney R-1 School District,6 a federal district court in Missouri
considered a harassment claim in a school setting where the plain-
tiffs alleged that the defendant and its agents "failed to fulfill their
duty to stop inappropriate sexual harassment,"'' which, again,
appears to say that there are two types of sexual harassment-the
appropriate kind and the inappropriate kind. In a federal court in
California, a defendant's behavior, which included groping the
plaintiffs' breasts and genital areas, commenting on their breast
sizes, and exposing himself to them in public, was characterized as
"sexual harassment and other forms of rude, obnoxious, and inap-
propriate behavior.""8 We pause to wonder which of the de-
fendant's activities were actionable sexual harassment and which
were merely "inappropriate," meaning not actionable. Maybe these
judges throw in the A-word as a way of saying they don't want to
talk about it. 9
83. Id.
84. Id. at 474.
85. Munn v. Mayor of Savannah, 906 F. Supp. 1577, 1581 (S.D. Ga. 1995).
86. 904 F. Supp. 1006 (W.D. Mo. 1995).
87. Id. at 1013.
88. Coplin v. Conejo Valley Unified School Dist., 903 F. Supp. 1377, 1380 (C.D. Cal.
1995) (emphasis added).
89. Justice O'Connor demonstrated such avoidance when the Court considered
whether police violated a suspect's Fifth Amendment rights when, prior to securing a
Miranda waiver, they lied to the suspect's counsel regarding his client's interrogation and
failed to alert the suspect about his lawyer's desire to be present at any interrogation.
See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986). Reviewing the validity of the suspect's waiv-
er, and eschewing reliance on the A-word, Judge Coffin of the First Circuit had charac-
terized the interrogating officers' behavior as claimworthy, and found that "the failure to
inform a suspect in custody that his attorney or an attorney retained for him was seeking
to see him vitiated his waiver of his Fifth Amendment right to assistance of counsel at
his questioning." Burbine v. Moran, 753 F.2d 178, 186 (1st Cir. 1985). Judge Coffin also
observed:
Deliberate or reckless misleading of an attorney, who has a legitimate, profes-
sionally ethical interest in a suspect in custody and who expresses to the police
[VCol. 46:781
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We imagine a manager's (or lawyer's) attempt to formulate a
workplace sexual harassment policy with decisions such as these to
guide her. The "sample sexual harassment policy" suggested in a
Practicing Law Institute Handbook encourages employers to begin
with the following "statement of policy": "[Employer Inc.] is com-
mitted to maintaining a work environment that encourages and
fosters appropriate conduct among employees and respect for
individual values and sensibilities." 0 This, of course, settles very
little; the problem is figuring out when rudeness, boorishness, and
unkindness-all of which are inappropriate-as-improper-are also
inappropriate-as-illegal. A journalist, looking at all of the preced-
ing attempts to describe the law, took them to encourage moral
behavior, depending on extra-legal sources to determine what
morality requires: "If men and women are temporarily more cau-
tious and self-conscious about what they may say and do, that
may not be too high a price to pay for a new understanding of
what is appropriate behavior, and what is not."'" She suggests
that the inquiry for managers (or mere lawyers) is not really for
an understanding of "appropriate behavior," but rather, for moral-
ly right, virtuous, and legal behavior. We think she's right, but we
can imagine Ms. Provenzano saying, "Lots of luck."
The problem, we think, will be resolved when announcements
of legal judgments by judges and scholars consistently provide a
context for deciding what is "appropriate" (as in "fitting").92
Without context, the politically correct adjective "inappropriate"
detracts from the severity and wrongness of the behavior at issue.
The word does not point to moral judgment, as the journalist
hoped; it points away from moral judgment.
a desire to be present at any interrogation of the suspect, combined with a
police failure to communicate that exchange to the suspect, is more than just
one factor in the calculus of waiver. This combination of circumstances clearly
vitiates any claim that a waiver of counsel was knowing and voluntary.
Id. at 187. Taking a different view of these facts, and invoking the A-word, Justice
O'Connor stated that "[a]lthough highly inappropriate, even deliberate deception of an
attorney could not possibly affect a suspect's decision to waive his Miranda rights unless
he were at least aware of the incident." Moran, 475 U.S. at 423. Under Justice
O'Connor's view, "inappropriate" apparently means wrong, disfavored and even deceptive,
but not illegal or unconstitutional.
90. Sample Sexual Harassment Policies, in SEXUAL HARASSMENT LTIOATION, at 433
(PLI Litig. & Admin, Practice Course Handbook Series No. 520, 1995).
91. Nancy Gibbs, Relationship of the Year: Man and Woman, TIME, Jan. 6, 1992, at
47.
92. See infra Section 11I.C.
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Ill. THREE PERSPECriVEs
We propose three broad perspectives for somewhat more
serious consideration of the use of the A-word in ethics and in
jurisprudence. The first treats it as a linguistic phenomenon, simi-
lar to many other shifts in language, that might show how moral
discourse deteriorated among the English-speaking peoples as their
societies became more "pluralistic." The second considers uses of
the word as a form of earnest ethical argument in which a serious
claim of appropriateness (or a serious accusation of inappropriate-
ness) means something. The third returns to the subject of sexual
harassment law for an example of a proper use of "appropriate"
in a legal context.
A. The Dynamics of Moral Words
1. Rational. The use of the word "rational," to begin with the
first of a number of suggestive analogues, teems with history and
complexity. 3 Its root meaning identifies a mode or product of
thought; to say that a principle or proposition is "rational" is to
say that one is prepared to give reasons for it, to attempt to
persuade others that the principle or proposition makes sense.'
The adjective has had this meaning since the Middle Ages. Often,
in early usage, its meaning was anchored to broad theological
reasoning. Chaucer talks about a "reasonable prayer."95 Raymond
Williams located a seventeenth century religious argument for
"reasonable wage demands."96 Sometimes the word derogatorily
referred to carnal appetite, to "carnal reason"-medieval people
being lusty thinkers, as we know from Chaucer and Boccaccio. 7
In these senses, from early usage, the appeal "developed a
very early specialized sense of moderation or limitation, which
says much about the understanding of the human condition within
93. See RAYMOND WILIAMS, KEYWORDS: A VOCABULARY OF CULTURE AND SOCI-
ETY 251-52 (rev. ed. Oxford Univ. Press 1985).
94. However, Martha Minow persuasively argues that "making sense" tends to ex-
clude most people who are not male, "normal," and, in the typical case in which that
appeal is made, white. See MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE INCLUSION,
EXCLUSION, AND AmERICAN LAW 146-72 (1990). Rationality, like natural-law reasoning,
has as its premise "a basic human nature, found in the abstract individual capable of rea-
son... [which] risks excluding any who do not meet it." Id. at 156.
95. See WILLAMS, supra note 95, at 253.
96. Id.
97. See id.
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a medieval theological perspective."" As late as the seventeenth
century, to call someone a "rationalist" was to accuse him, in his
arrogant and ultimate dependence on "sensible evidence" and his
disdain for scripture and the memory of the church, of being an
atheist-and therefore of not being reasonable at all.99 Whatever
the soundness of either side of that meta-ethical argument, each
was at least relatively clear, so that, even in that venue, "in the
most bitter disputes, most parties ... claimed to have reason on
their side."'0
Then, as a product of the Enlightenment, "rational" began to
claim a particular ethical provenance. It pointed to "a set of uni-
versal principles as distinguished from reason as the faculty of con-
nected and demonstrated argument."' 0 ' In this phase those mak-
ing the appeal tended to use "rational" as often as they used
"reason" meaning "reasonable." The Enlightenment appeals to
"rationality" were not the same as the medieval characterization of
humans as rational animals, but they retained a basis in ethical
theory that both speaker and hearer took into account."° If
there was (and is) an objection to reason as "a set of universal
principles," it is that the Enlightenment turned human reason into
a goddess and appropriated to itself the ability to judge the sound-
ness of other kinds of moral argument."3
And then, in what we think of as a final stage, the claim that
rationality is universal ran up against the fact that one person's ra-
tionality does not work the same way another person's does.3"
98. Id.
99. See id. at 254; see also Stanley Fish, Why We Can't All Just Get Along, FIRST
THINGS, Feb. 1996, at 18, 20 ("[O]ne wonders what Augustine means by a 'reasonable
person.' The answer is that a reasonable person is a person who believes what Augustine
believes and who, like Augustine, can only hear assertions contrary to that belief as ab-
surd.").
100. WILIAMS, supra note 93, at 253.
101. Id.
102. See id.
103. A tendency, we note, that lingers in modem American law reviews.
104. See ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, TBREE RiVAL VERSIONS OF MORAL INQUIRY
170-95 (1990) (restating this argument, in large part from his own earlier work); see also
ROBERT L WILKEN, REMEMBERING THE CHRISTIAN PAST 169-72 (1995) (arguing that
rationality must be located within a tradition and cannot be an autonomous categoriza-
tion); Michael Donaldson, Some Reservations about Law and Postmodernism, 40 Am. J.
JURIS. 335, 337 (1995) ("Foundational to this 'theory' is the denial of absolutes and
methods of categorization. People are to be seen as a point of intersection for millions
of experiences, thoughts, and images. Thus it is the particular, rather than the universal,
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This late historical development turned into a morality of autono-
my, which, as we perceive it, says that no person's reason can be
coherently labelled superior to any other person's reason. And
that, in moral terms, means that no one need listen to anyone
else: every person is her own tyrant. That position was, we guess,
interesting for a while for ethics, but it seems to have run its
course-as is signalled by the popular academic label "post mod-
em.1)105
2. Subjective has had a similar, modem fate. To call
something subjective, in the early nineteenth century, was to claim
no more than that it existed "in the mind of him who judges,"
that is, that it was unreachable for ethical discourse." This
sometimes had a positive cast, as in reflection on the human dig-
nity of a person even as she makes a subjective argument. Since
then, however, "subjective" has been commonly used in contrast
aspects of people and of life which are to be exalted.").
Professor Macntyre also contributed to modem ethical reflection the neo-Aristo-
telian notion of the "practice," an activity-related small community for moral formation
and reflection. See ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 187-94 (2d ed. 1984). In
discussing the consequent issue of whether a person thinking ethically, within a practice,
can manage without resorting to the perspective of persons not in the practice, Professor
Stanley Fish said: "To think within a practice is to have one's very perception and sense
of possible and appropriate action issue 'naturally'--without further reflection-from one's
position as a deeply situated agent." STANLEY E. FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURAL-
LY 386-87 (1989). That is, what is rational in ethics includes the intuitive, but only, we
suppose, when the context of a particular practice is described or invoked.
105. The term "postmoder" is not used much among careful thinkers. It seems to
have become trendy first in critical studies of art and architecture. In speculative thought,
it has come to signal rejection of ideas associated with the Enlightenment. Michael
Weingrad says it "includes semiotic, deconstructive, psychoanalytical, and post-structural
anthropological approaches to the analysis of art, politics, and culture." Michael
Weingrad, Jews (in Theory): Representations of Judaism, Anti-Semitism, and the Holocaust
in Postmodern French Thought, 45 JUDAIsM: A QJ. OF JEWISH LIFE & THOUGHT 79, 79
(1996). Michael Donaldson's reference is less complex: "Postmodernism . . .is the rejec-
tion of this faith in rationalism, and a recognition that any argument, no matter how
perfectly logical, is only as good as its presuppositions." Donaldson, supra note 104, at
336. Gertrude Himmelfarb says postmodemism is the same as post-structuralism and is
familiarly known in academic circles and computer networks as "pomo." GERTRUDE
HIMMELFARB, ON LOOING INTO THE ABYSS 132 (1994). Ernest Gellner says post-
modernism "is strong and fashionable. Over and above this, it is not altogether clear
what the devil it is." ERNEST GELLNER, POSTMODERNiSM, REASON AND RELGION 22
(1992). And Alice M. McKenzie says it "should be flattered at its ability to draw a
crowd." Alice M. McKenzie, "Different Strokes for Different Folks": America's Quintessen-
tial Postmodern Proverb, 53 THEOLOGY TODAY 201, 201 (1996).
106. WILLIAMS, supra note 93, at 311.
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with the nobler "objective"; to claim "that there can be a kind of
art or kind of thinking in which the active subject is not pres-
ent."'"° The objective (not subjective) is something that can be
taken as factual or fair-minded "and hence reliable." 08 That
something is also sometimes called rational. The result is a
confusion not unlike the confusion we have attempted to describe
for the A-word: "Subjective and objective, we might say, need to
be thought through-in the language rather than within any
particular school-every time we wish to use [either] word."'' °
3. Standard. The early use of "standard" was to claim "an
authoritative example of correctness." Royal Standard is an
example, as is the "standard foot.""0 Then the word becomes a
boast, as in "Standard Oil Company," where the word is "a term
of assessment or grading ... a concept of graded progress within
a hierarchy.""' Raymond Williams says, "It is often impossible,
in these uses, to disagree with some assertion of standards without
appearing to disagree with the very idea of quality. ' ' " He gives
the familiar example of "university standards," when the claim
(boast) goes so far as "a generalizing version of the essence of a
civilization."" The modem development has been that the word
merely signals disagreement, without implying an agreed-upon
source for resolution of the disagreement, as in "standard wage"
or "standard of living."" 4
4. Civilized. Early use here pointed to a process rather than
a judgment-as in the legal distinction between a criminal case
and a civil case." By the late sixteenth century it had come to
be a cultural boast as well-as when Thomas Hooker speaks of a
"civil society" or Boswell compares civilization and barbarity 6 -
and not, then, "so much a process as a state of social order and
107. Id
108. Id
109. Id at 312.
110. Id at 296.
111. Id at 297.
112. Id
113. Id
114. Id at 298.
115. See id at 48.
116. Id. (citations omitted).
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refinement." In the boasting stage-as in these examples-the
word claims the superiority of "an achieved condition. 11 7 Burke
refers, for instance, to "our manners, our civilization, and all the
good things which are connected with manners, and with
civilization."" 8
As soon as influential thinkers start boasting about civiliza-
tion, the romantics begin scoffing at them and talking about "cul-
ture" instead; they invite the hearer to talk in the plural ("civiliza-
tions"), and to take his choice.119 It was possible, that is, to ar-
gue, as Coleridge did, that "civilization," in Boswell's use of the
word, is at best "a mixed good, if not far more a corrupting influ-
ence. 9 120 Williams concedes that the word still retains "some nor-
mative quality," but suggests that, for the most part, it is no lon-
ger useful in ethics.
5. Tasteful Taste is a good word with which to end this list,
since throughout its development it has suggested (take your
choice) individualism, subjectivity, or autonomy. Both Cicero and
Aquinas said that, in matters of taste, there is no (interesting) dis-
pute.' But the word has had some indicative escapades along
the way. In thirteenth century England it was used where a
modem would say "touch" or "feel." It signalled human ex-
perience, and came a bit later to the moral claim that it is a good
thing to have ennobling experiences.' Addison spoke, in the
eighteenth century, of "the fine taste of writing," for example."z
In the nineteenth century it was, in Williams' phrase, "reanimated"
in its pejorative sense (matters of taste being not worth taking
into account). And today, in Williams' assessment, it mostly signals
the consumer who for inaccessible reasons prefers one kind of
beer to another.'
These examples tend to show, as our introductory exploration
of the A-word does, that our moral discourse has deteriorated into
117. Id.
118. Id. at 99 (citation omitted).
119. Id. at 50.
120. Ad at 49-50 (citation omitted).
121. Id. at 50.
122. See id.
123. See id at 313.
124. Id
125. See id at 315.
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a radical individualism that makes ethical argument virtually im-
possible.' But against that observation one should note that
such words and uses of such words in some ways retain moral
force. Lakoff and Johnson, in their study of metaphors, demon-
strate that moral words can take on meaning by taking on meta-
phorical context.' For example, "Love is a journey, love is mad-
ness."
128
Even non-moral words take on moral meaning as they take
on context: "gun," for example, as in "fake gun." That makes
both positive claims for the object (a fake gun is, in some sense, a
gun) and negative ones (a fake gun doesn't shoot).29 Miles
asked your elder author, his grandfather, as he and his brother
Ezra and I came to a fallen tree in the woods, and Miles needed
both hands to get over the log, to "hold my gun for a minute."
Ezra said, "That is not a gun; it is a stick that looks like a gun."
Miles said, "I know that, but sometimes I like to call it a gun that
looks like a stick."
The point in this passing reflection on metaphors is that meta-
phorical context for words, even words that in direct signification
have lost whatever moral force they once had, if any, may revive
moral quality and even turn listless words into comprehensive
moral judgment. Which could be to say that, focusing on notions
such as "situation" and "what fits"--that is, on context-makes it
more rather than less possible to make moral sense out of whatev-
er is for the moment trendy in popular discourse. And that brings
us to a second possibility for "appropriate."
B. Maybe "Appropriate" Means Something in Ethics
In a new study of the teachings of Jesus on wealth, Sondra
Ely Wheeler, a teacher of Christian ethics, takes issue with the
late Reinhold Niebuhr, one of the twentieth century masters of
her trade.' She does it by invoking a method of ethical reason-
126. See SHAFFER & SHAFER, supra note 57, at 9-21.
127. See GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY 115 (1980);
see also Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Metaphors Matter: How Images of Battle, Sports, and
Sex Shape the Adversary System, 10 WiS. WOMEN'S LU. 225, 228, 256-66 (1995) (assess-
ing the impact of metaphors for the adversary system on the behavior and identity of
those who work within it).
128. LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 127, at 115, 117.
129. See id. at 121.
130. See SONDRA ELY WHEELER, WEALTH AS PERIL AND OBLIGATION 60-61 (1995).
8071997]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
ing often attributed to Niebuhr's brother Richard, and in doing so
she uses the A-word as the focus of her moral reasoning. Her
usage is careful; it is not an instance of decadence in moral
thought. It gives us hope that the A-word might be used well in
an ethical context.
One of the biblical texts Wheeler invokes is the twelfth chap-
ter of St. Luke's Gospel, primarily the "do not worry" discourse in
Luke 12:22- 3 4 . 1' Reinhold Niebuhr, in a judgment indicative of
a broad argument he made in Christian ethics, said the discourse
concerning the ethical problem of rewards revealed "the complete-
ly unprudential rigorism" of Jesus' ethic.m Wheeler disagrees:
Jesus commands his disciples 'do not be anxious' and provides
three arguments for the inappropriateness of anxiety. It is inade-
quate because it springs from an inadequate understanding of
human life; it is unnecessary because God who feeds the birds
will feed them; and it is ineffective because no one can add any-
thing to his life by it ....
131.
And he said to his disciples: ... [Do not worry about your life, what
you might eat, nor about your body, what you might put on.
For life is more than food, and the body more than clothing.
Think of the ravens, that they neither sow nor reap, they have neither
storehouse nor barn, and God feeds them: by how much you surpass the birdsl
... which of you can, by worrying, add a foot to your height?
Therefore, if you cannot do the smallest thing, why do you worry about
the other things?
Think of the wild lilies, how they growl They do not toil nor spin; but I
tell you, Solomon in all his glory was not arrayed like one of these.
But if God thus clothes the grass in a field, which exists today and to-
morrow is thrown in an oven, how much more [will he clothe] you, o ones
with little faithl
And do not look for what you may eat and what you may drink, and do
not be anxious; for all the nations of the world pursue these things, and your
Father knows that you need them.
But rather, look for his kingdom, and these things will be given to you
as well.
Fear no more, little flock, because it has pleased your Father to give you
the kingdom.
Sell your possessions and give alms; make for yourselves purses that do
not grow old, an unfailing treasure in the heavens where no thief comes near
nor moth destroys;
For where your treasure is, there too your heart will be.
Id. at 59-60 (Wheeler's translation from the Greek).
132. REINHOLD NIEBUHR, AN INTERPRETAION OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS 25 (Seabury
Press 1979) (1935). It has even been argued elsewhere that the extremism proved that St.
Luke's report was authentic. See WHEELER, supra note 130, at 61 (citation omitted).
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Thus faith is the critical point; what must appear to one
without faith as impossible and foolhardy counsel may be seen
by those with it to be the only reasonable course, the one based
on the truth about human beings and the world in which they
live .m
That is, the faith Jesus enjoins is reality, is objective, reasonable,
natural-and appropriate: "What unites these disparate appeals
here and throughout the chapter, and makes their union intelligi-
ble, is Jesus' own 'reality perspective.'"" That is, the moral sub-
stance of the discourse is a response 1) to what is going on; and
2) to what God is doing in the world. The Kingdom has come.
The accumulation of wealth is vain and useless, because you can't
take it with you; and it is a waste of effort for a believer because
God will take care of her. In each of these senses, and in both of
them, Reinhold Niebuhr's appeal to worldly prudence is not ap-
propriate.
Wheeler's reflection on the quoted discourse takes on Rein-
hold Niebuhr's "Christian realism" pointedly when she concludes
one of these reflections: "To one who accepts Jesus' proclamation
and is willing to shape her life by it, even the 'hard sayings' of
chapter 12 are cause for rejoicing; they may be received as a liber-
ation from anxiety, the promise of ultimate security rather than
the demand for ultimate risk. 135
Wheeler uses "appropriate" where H. Richard Niebuhr would
have said "responsible."' 6 The idea in religious ethics rests on a
133. WHEELER, supra note 130, at 63-64.
134. Id. at 66.
135. Id. at 68. Wheeler extends her analysis into the latter part of Luke's chapter 12,
the parables that commend "the wise and faithful steward" and disapprove of the un-
faithful servant who cheats his master.
Two things are especially noteworthy. One is that the servant's infidelity
arises out of his incorrect belief about his master's return; it is his defective
understanding of reality that leads to his undoing. The other is that the image
of fidelity used by the parable is obedient stewardship of food and drink, sug-
gesting that the area of obedience in question is related to the disposition of
material goods.
Thus, the teaching about anxiety and possessions offered in verses 22-34
is placed by Luke between a consideration of appropriate and inappropriate
objects of fear (12:1-21) and a vivid parabolic presentation of the blessing or
punishment received according to one's readiness for the kingdom (12:35-48)
instanced by obedient disposition of goods. In all of these passages, human atti-
tudes and actions are considered as they spring from underlying beliefs, and
tend toward certain ends.
Id. at 67.
136. See I-L RICHARD NIEBUHR, THE RESPONSIBLE SELF (1963); see also ALBERT R.
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distinction Niebuhr borrowed from Martin Buber 37-the differ-
ence between an "I-Thou" relation, which is "known and active
in... dialectic," and an "I-It" relation, which is no relation at all
because the "other" in an "I-It" encounter "is not a reflexive
being. It does not know itself as known; it only knows; were it not
for the accompanying I-Thou situation it would not know that it
knows. It values but does not value itself or its evaluations. 13 8
From that focus, H. Richard Niebuhr (in what was originally a
series of lectures, given late in life, to a group of Scots academics)
contrasted three ways of talking about morals. The first, oldest,
and most Greek is to evaluate morals in reference to goals and
purposes in life; Niebuhr called it "man the maker" ethics;39
modem teachers of ethics often call it "teleological" (from "telos,"
the Greek word for "goal"). 4 An ethical argument following
this way of "doing" ethics would require a demonstration of the
goal being contemplated. Aristptle is the classical example of doing
ethics that way. When a "teleologist" uses the A-word, she has to
include consideration of the contemplated goal or risk being inco-
herent (a bad word among ethicists). The second is often called
"deontological," that is, moral evaluation reasoned from principles
or commands; Niebuhr called it "man the citizen" ethics."' A
person arguing in this way needs to demonstrate a principle or
rule, such as Kant's invocation of the categorical imperative.
The third, and Niebuhr's lasting contribution to modem reli-
gious ethics, is the ethics of responsibility-or, we dare to say,
with Professor Wheeler, the ethics of the appropriate. Wheeler
invokes that school of ethical thought when she attends to Jesus'
view of what is real-both of what is going on and of what God is
doing. Niebuhr's theory was probably also the intellectual ancestor
of Joseph Fletcher's once popular "situation ethics.""4 It asks, in
JONSEN, RESPONSIBILITY IN MODERN REuious ETmIcs 140-147 (1968).
137. See MARTIN BUBER, I AND THOU (Walter Kaufman trans., 1970).
138. NIEBUHR, supra note 136, at 72-73. Buber went, we think, even further than
that-into the ontological observation that, until a human person encounters a "Thou," in
addition to all of her "Its," she does not even come into existence. See BUBER, supra
note 137, at 120-22.
139. See NIEBUHR, supra note 136, at 48-49.
140. See WESYM-ISTER DICTIONARY OF CHRISTIAN ETHIcs 67 (James F. Childress &
John MacQuarrie eds., 1986).
141. See NIEBUHR, supra note 136, at 60.
142. See WESTMINSTER DICTIONARY OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS, supra note 140, at
586-88.
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Niebuhr's formulation, 1) "to whom am I responsible?" and 2) "in
what community?" Niebuhr and his followers refer to it as the
ethics of the fitting, the moral question being, "In this situation,
what is appropriate?" That last was Wheeler's word, but Niebuhr
would likely agree that it can be used here:
[P]urposiveness seeks to answer the question: "What shall I do?"
by raising as prior the question: "What is my goal, ideal, or
telos?" Deontology tries to answer the moral query by asking,
first of all: "What is the law and what is the first law of my
life?" Responsibility, however, proceeds in every moment of de-
cision and choice to inquire, "What is going on?" If we use value
terms then the differences among the three approaches may be
indicated by the terms, the good, the right, and the fitting;, for
teleology is concerned always with the highest good to which it
subordinates the right; consistent deontology is concerned with
the right, no matter what may happen to our goods; but for the
ethics of responsibility the fitting action, the one that fits into a
total interaction as response and as anticipation of further re-
sponse, is alone conducive to the good and alone is right.'4 '
Thus, H. Richard Niebuhr resolved the tension between the ethics
of virtue and the ethics of duty by suggesting a third category that
puts context at the center of ethical discussion. The word "appro-
priate" can be a way to signal ethical (and legal) orientation, but
it won't work unless it comes with the context on which the theo-
ry, and therefore the discussion, depend.
C. Maybe "Appropriate" Means Something in Law
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, via its Chief Judge
Posner, used the A-word correctly in an emerging area of Title
VII law. Recently, the courts have struggled with whether Title
VII contemplates a cause of action for same-sex sexual harass-
ment.'" Expressing his views on the dilemma, Judge Posner not-
ed that "[s]exual harassment of women by men is the most com-
mon kind, but we do not mean to exclude the possibility that
sexual harassment of men by women, or men by other men, or
143. NIEBUHR, supra note 136, at 60-61.
144. Se4 e.g., Tanner v. Prima Donna Resorts, Inc., 919 F. Supp. 351, 354-55 (D.
Nev. 1996) (holding that Title VII "protects all persons, whether male or female, hetero-
sexual or homosexual, from discrimination based on sex," but noting that "many recent
district court opinions have struggled" with same-sex Title VII claims).
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women by other women would not also be actionable in appropri-
ate cases."1 4 The context in which Judge Posner made this ob-
servation indicates that he thinks "appropriate" describes the le-
gality of the conduct itself. He wrote:
The concept of sexual harassment is designed to protect working
women from the kind of male attentions that can make the
workplace hellish for women.... Drawing the line is not always
easy. On one side lie sexual assaults; other physical contact,
whether amorous or hostile, for which there is no consent ex-
press or implied; uninvited sexual solicitations; intimidating words
or acts; obscene language or gestures; pornographic pictures....
On the other side lies the occasional vulgar banter, tinged with
sexual innuendo, of coarse or boorish workers.'"
Acknowledging the difficulty in distinguishing inappropriate (ille-
gal) behavior from appropriate (legal though perhaps, to some,
offensive) behavior, Judge Posner continued:
We spoke in [an earlier case] of "the line that separates the
merely vulgar and mildly offensive from the deeply offensive and
sexually harassing." ... It is not a bright line, obviously, this line
between a merely unpleasant working environment on the one
hand and a hostile or deeply repugnant one on the other; and
when it is uncertain on which side the defendant's conduct lies,
the jury's verdict, whether for or against the defendant, cannot
be set aside in absence of trial error. Our case is not within the
area of uncertainty. [The alleged harasser], whatever his qualities
as a sales manager, is not a man of refinement; but neither is he
a sexual harasser.
He never touched the plaintiff. He did not invite her, explic-
itly or by implication, to have sex with him, or to go out on a
date with him. He made no threats. He did not expose himself,
or show her dirty pictures. He never said anything to her that
could not be repeated on primetime television. 47
So it seems that in the Seventh Circuit, following Baskerville, inap-
propriate behavior is that which is actionable, and appropriate be-
havior is that which is not.
In a recent hostile work environment decision by the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals, yet another court followed Judge
145. Baskerville v. Culligan Int'l Co., 50 F.3d 428, 430 (7th Cir. 1995).
146. Id. (citations omitted).
147. Id. at 431 (citations omitted).
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Posner's elegant diction. In Black v. Zaring Homes, Inc.,'48 Judge
Kennedy reviewed a jury's verdict and award of compensatory and
punitive damages to a plaintiff who had been subjected to numer-
ous workplace comments about women's anatomy. The magistrate
judge found that the evidence "revealed 'an atmosphere of a
grade-school-level fascination with women's body parts combined
with denigrating comments about women' which were 'not appro-
priate in the workplace."" 49 Citing Judge Posner's Baskerville
opinion with approval, Judge Kennedy emphasized that not every
type of conduct which might be offensive is actionable."s She
stated: "[T]here may be times when offensive comments have an
impact in the workplace, indeed constitute 'harassment,' but do
not create an objectively hostile work environment. Not all
workplace conduct that may be described as 'harassment' affects a
'term, condition, or privilege' of employment within the meaning
of Title VII."'' Reversing the verdict, the court found that
"even when construed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, the
conduct does not appear to have been more than 'merely offen-
sive,"" 2 and noted that "Title VII was 'not designed to purge
the workplace of vulgarity."" 53 It remains to be seen whether
other circuits will adopt Judge Posner's appropriate use of "ap-
propriate."
CONCLUSION
The A-word, then, makes sense in ethics, including legal eth-
ics, in the law, and in jurisprudence, if and when the person using
it shows how it fits, is able to provide a context. Indeed, with such
assistance, "appropriate" not only makes sense, becoming useful
for deliberation of all kinds; it also emerges as a particularly at-
tractive choice for those who argue from narrative, from stories,
and from social science. The A-word is still hackneyed, of course,
but that aesthetic objection, an appeal to taste, does not ruin it for
ethics and jurisprudence."'
148. 104 F.3d 822 (6th Cir. 1997).
149. Id at 825.
150. See id at 826-27.
151. Id. at 827 (quoting Menitor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986)).
152. IL at 826 (quoting Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993)).
153. Id. at 827 (quoting Baskerville, 50 F.3d at 430).
154. The headline writers we took to task in our opening pages might fairly claim
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So, then, it is appropriate to use "appropriate"--sometimes.
It makes sense when the writer is carefully attending to the
cast of characters, the time, the place, and the culture when she
rules on what is proper. This is true when judgments about propri-
ety are also communal moral judgments. The underlying ethical
insight, as in Miss Manners' analysis of traditions that allow the
throwing of food, is that offensive behavior is often not only im-
proper but also wrong.
It does not, though, make sense to use the A-word when the
writer, in addressing propriety, is attempting either to hide his
moral judgment, or to lay claim to the modem ethics of radical
individualism-to claim that what makes behavior moral or not is
whether the actor chooses it, that the only mistake in ethics is to
allow oneself to be influenced by those around her. That position,
in ethics, leads nowhere.
After the deck is cleared, then, it is possible to re-read the
legal examples and to conclude that, in general, judges' use of the
A-word confuses more than it helps legal reasoning, except in the
inevitable circumstances where sloppy legislators have used it-no
doubt to avoid sounding moralistic-and thus have given judges
and lawyers no choice. It is also possible-and necessary-to sort
out examples of jurisprudential and moral judgment, separating
those in derogation of sound, interesting, ethical argument from
those that invoke enough context to be sound and interesting from
either of the two perspectives we suggest are (forgive us) appro-
priate for ethical discussion.
that we should apply this argument for "context" to their art, which, after all, is append-
ed to the context provided by reporters. The reporters would then be reduced to the
complaint that their careful prose is desecrated when hackneyed phrases in large type are
piled on top of it.
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